Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

First published 1988

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Origins of modern critical thought: German aesthetic and literary criticism from Lessing to Hegel/edited by David Simpson.
p. cm.
Bibligraphy: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-521-35004-2. ISBN 0-521-35902-3 (pbk.)
1. Aesthetics, German – 18th century. 2. Aesthetics, German – 19th century. 3. Criticism—Germany. 4. Literature, Modern – 18th century – History and criticism – Theory, etc. 5. Literature, Modern – 19th century – History and criticism – Theory, etc.
I. Simpson, David, 1951 -
BH221.G3075 1988
111'.85'0943–dc19 88-23383 CIP

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

The origins of modern critical thought:
German aesthetic and literary criticism
From Lessing to Hegel
1. Aesthetics
I. Simpson, David
111'.85
ISBN 0-521-35004-2 hard covers
ISBN 0-521-35902-3 paperback

Contents

Citations and abbreviations

Most references give the name of the author and the date of the edition cited, so that the bibliography should be consulted for full details.

The following abbreviations have been used:

AE	Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*
Ak.	*Kants gesammelte Schriften,* Akademie Edition
CJ	Kant, *Critique of Judgement*
DS	*German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism; Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel,* ed. David Simpson
HBN	*German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Winckelmann, Lessing, Hamann, Herder, Schiller and Goethe,* ed. H. B. Nisbet
KFSA	*Kritische Friedrich–Schlegel–Ausgabe*
KMW	*German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: The Romantic Ironists and Goethe,* ed. Kathleen M. Wheeler
SW	*Sämtliche Werke* (for Fichte and Schelling)
System	Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*

The origins of modern critical thought: German aesthetic and literary criticism from Lessing to Hegel

Edited by
David Simpson



Cambridge University Press
Cambridge
New York New Rochelle
Melbourne Sydney

From *Philosophy of Art* [*Philosophie der Kunst*]

Lectures given in Jena in the winter of 1802–3, and repeated in 1804–5 in Würzburg

Translated by Elizabeth Rubenstein and DS.

German text in *SW, V,* 718f.

Introductory note

Schelling's 1802–3 lectures are openly and consciously eclectic, drawing frequently upon the work of August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel as well as upon other contemporaries and precursors. To try to recover all the borrowings and overlaps, and to assess the precise degree of Schelling's deviations from them, would be a considerable scholarly task, one which the present editor has not attempted. This is especially true of the account of Shakespeare, who had been widely translated into German (although the great Schlegel and Tieck translation was only 'under way' when Schelling was giving these lectures), and was already regarded as an adopted son by the German critics and theorists. Some account of the place of Shakespeare in German Romanticism can be gained by consulting Stahl (1947), Pascal (1937), and Ralli (1932), I, 108f.

Crabb Robinson (1929), p. 119, noted the remarks Schelling delivered at a dinner party in December 1802:

> the Raptures with which he speaks of Shakespear are boundless – tho' he praises so mystically & so metaphysically that you wo[d] not be able to comprehend one Word of his Eulogy And he does not scruple to say that not one of the Editors of Shakespear has the least presentim[t] or suspicion of his real Worth: Shakespear is a sealed book to the whole english Nation.

This mood of excessive praise does not however completely accord with the arguments of the lectures, given below.

On modern dramatic poetry

I shall continue with an exposition of tragedy and comedy in the modern dramatists. So as not to be completely submerged in this vast sea, I shall seek to draw attention to the few major points on which modern drama *differs* from the ancient, and to remark on its *coincidence* with it, and on its own specific features. I shall base these relationships once again on the determinate view [Anschauung] of what we must recognize as the most

important phenomena in modern tragedy and comedy. Therefore in considering the major points I shall refer especially to Shakespeare.

The first thing which we must begin by considering is that the *combination* [*Mischung*] *of opposites,* thus of the tragic and comic especially, is the fundamental principle of modern drama. The following reflection will serve to make us grasp the importance of this combination: the tragic and the comic could be presented in a state of completeness as an unsublimated [nicht aufgehobenen] indifference,[1] but then the poetry [Poesie] would have to be neither tragic nor comic. It would be quite a different genre: it would be epic poetry. In epic poetry the two elements which are stressfully at variance in the drama are not united but yet not truly separate. The combination of these two elements in such a way that they do not appear at all separate cannot therefore be the distinguishing feature of modern tragedy, which entails rather a combination in which both are clearly differentiated and in such a way that the poet shows himself to be simultaneously master of both, as is Shakespeare, who focusses dramatic energy toward both opposite poles. And the *most heartrending* Shakespeare is in Falstaff and in Macbeth.

Yet we can consider this combination of opposing elements as the striving of modern drama to return to the epic, without thereby becoming epic; just as on the other hand the same poetry in the epic strives toward the dramatic through the novel. This poetry thus overcomes the pure limits of the higher art forms from both sides.

For this *combination* it is necessary that the poet has not simply got pieces of tragedy and pieces of comedy at his command, but that he should be a master of nuances; like Shakespeare, who in the comic is tender, adventurous and witty all at the same time, as in *Hamlet,* and earthy (as in the Falstaff plays) without ever being vulgar; just as in the tragic he is devastating (as in *Lear*), punishing (as in *Macbeth*), and stirring, touching and calming, as in *Romeo and Juliet* and in other plays in the mixed mode.

Let us now look at the subject matter of modern tragedy. This also had to have a mythological dignity [Würde], at least in its most perfect manifestation. There were therefore only three possible sources out of which the subject matter could be derived. The separate myths which, like those of Greek tragedy, had not unified themselves into epic wholes, remained outside the broad circle of the universal epic: they were expressed in the modern world through the *novellas.* Legendary or poetic history [Historie] provided a second source. The third source is made up of religious myths and legends and the stories of the saints. Shakespeare took material from the first two of these, since the third did not provide subject matter suited to his age and to his nation. It was especially the Spanish, among them Calderón, who took material from here. Shakespeare, therefore, found his material ready made. In this sense he was not an *inventor,* but in the way he used, arranged and brought to life his materials he showed himself in

his sphere to be like the ancient dramatists and to be the wisest of artists. It has been remarked and it is a fact that Shakespeare committed himself to the exact details of the given material, especially that of the novellas; that he included everything, down to the most minor circumstance, and left nothing out (this is a practice which could perhaps often throw light on the apparently groundless elements in some of his plots), changing what he was given as little as possible.[2]

Here too he is like the ancients – except Euripides, who as the more frivolous poet deliberately distorts the myths.

The next undertaking is [to decide] how far or not the essence of ancient tragedy is present in the modern. Is there a true idea of fate to be found in modern tragedy? Indeed, of that higher fate which in itself incorporates freedom?

As observed, Aristotle defines the supreme instance of tragedy as occurring when a just man commits a crime by mistake [Irrthum]. It must be added that this mistake is inflicted by necessity or by the gods, possibly even *against* freedom.[3] According to the concepts of the Christian religion this last example would seem to be impossible. Those powers which undermine the will and inflict not only harm but *evil* are themselves evil and infernal powers.

At the very least if a mistake caused by divine decree were to bring about calamity and crime, then in that same religion according to which this were a possibility there would also have to be the possibility of a corresponding forgiveness. This is certainly there in Catholicism which, by its nature a mixture of the sacred and the profane, ordains sin in order to demonstrate the power of the means of grace in the forgiveness of sin. Thus in Catholicism the possibility of the *true* tragic fate existed, though it differed from that of the ancients.[4]

Shakespeare was a Protestant, and this possibility was not open to him. If there is a fate in his work it can only be of a twofold nature. Harm is brought about by conjuring up evil and demonic powers, but according to Christian concepts these cannot be invincible, and resistance to them should *and* can be made. The inescapability of their effect, in so far as it is made apparent, is reflected in and reverts to the character [Charakter] or subject. So it is with Shakespeare. Character takes the place of the ancient tragic fate [Schicksal], but he places within it such a mighty destiny [Fatum] that it can be no longer regarded as free. Indeed, it stands forth as insuperable necessity.

A demonic trickery lures Macbeth into murder but there is no objective need for the deed. Banquo does not allow himself to be beguiled by the voice of the witches, but Macbeth does. Therefore it is character which decides.

The childish folly of an old man is presented in Lear in the manner of a

confusing delphic oracle, and the sweet Desdemona has to submit to the dark stain which is coupled with jealousy.

Because he had to place the necessity for the crime in the *character,* Shakespeare has had for the same reason to deal with the case *not* accepted by Aristotle as tragic, that of the criminal who plunges from happiness into misfortune with a terrible indifference.[5] In the place of fate in itself he has *nemesis* in all its forms, where horror is overwhelmed by horrors, one wave of blood drives the next one on, and the curse of the cursed is constantly being fulfilled, as the Wars of the Roses exemplify in English history. He *has* to show himself as a barbarian since he undertakes to show the worst kind of barbarity, such as the brutal battles of families amongst themselves, where all art [Kunst] seems at an end and brute force takes its place, as it is said in *Lear:*

> It will come,
> Humanity must perforce prey on itself,
> Like monsters of the deep.[6]

But here there are signs to be found that he has sent the grace [Anmuth] of art amongst the *furies,* who do not appear in their own shapes. Such is Margaret's love lament over the head of her unlawful and guilty lover and her parting from him.[7]

Shakespeare ends the sequence with Richard III, whom he makes pursue and attain his goal with monstrous energy, until he is driven from the heights of his achievement into the tight corner of despair. In the turmoil of the battle in which he is defeated he calls out, irretrievably lost:

> A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse![8]

In *Macbeth,* revenge forces its way step by step towards a nobler criminal led astray by an immoderate ambition, in such a way that, deceived by demonic illusions, he believes it to be far away.

A more gentle, indeed the mildest nemesis is to be found in *Julius Caesar.* Brutus does not perish so much because of avenging powers as because of the very mildness of a fine and tender disposition which moves him to take the wrong measures after the deed. He had made of his deed a sacrifice to virtue, as he believed he had to, and thereby sacrifies himself to it.

The difference between this nemesis and true *fate* [*Schicksal*] is however very significant. It comes from the real world and is rooted in *reality;* it is the nemesis that governs history, and Shakespeare found it *there* like the rest of his material. What brings it about is *freedom* quarrelling with *freedom;* it is a *sequence of events* [*Succession*], and the revenge is not immediately one with the crime.

In the cycle of the Greek presentations a nemesis also dominates, but

here necessity is limited and punished directly by necessity, and each situation taken on its own was a completed action.

From the very beginning all the tragic myths of the Greeks belonged more to art, and a steady communication and interpenetration of gods and men, as of fate, was natural to them, as well as the concept of an irresistible influence. Perhaps *chance* [*Zufall*] itself plays a part in one of the most unfathomable of Shakespeare's plays *(Hamlet),* but Shakespeare perceived it *with* its consequences: it is therefore intended by him and makes the greatest sense.

If after this we want to express in one word what Shakespeare is in relation to the sublime nature of ancient tragedy, then we will have to name him as the greatest inventor in *the realm of character* [*Charakteristischen*]. He cannot portray that sublime and as it were purified and transfigured beauty which proves itself against fate and becomes one with moral goodness – he cannot portray the beauty that he does portray in such a way that it appears in the *whole* and so that the totality of each work bears its image. He *knows* the highest beauty only as individual character. He has not been able to subordinate everything to it, because as a modern, who conceives of the eternal not within limits but in the unlimited, he is too diffuse in his universality. The ancients had a concentrated universality, a totality not in multiplicity but in unity.[9]

There is *nothing* in man that Shakespeare did not touch on, but he treats it individually whereas the Greeks treat it in its totality. The highest and the lowest elements in human nature lie dispersed in him: he knows *everything,* every passion, every state of mind, in youth and age, in the king and the shepherd boy. From the volumes of his works one would be able to recreate the lost earth. That ancient lyre on its own managed to draw the whole world out of *four* notes; the new instrument has a thousand strings.[10] It splits up the harmony of the universe in order to recreate it, and thus it is always less soothing for the soul. The austere, all-assuaging beauty can only exist in simplicity.

In accordance with the nature of the romantic principle modern comedy does not present the action as pure or isolated, or with the representational limits [plastischen Beschränkung] of ancient drama, but it presents all that goes with it at the same time. Only Shakespeare has given his tragedy the most concentrated wealth of detail and succinctness in every part as well as in the broad whole, but yet without any arbitrary excess and in such a way that it appears as the richness of nature itself, apprehended by artistic necessity. The intention of the *whole* remains clear, but then again plunges to inexhaustible depths where all points of view can be absorbed.

It goes without saying that with this kind of universality Shakespeare's world is not a limited one, and is not an ideal world, in as much as the ideal world itself is a limited and closed one. But on the other hand it is not the world that is directly opposed to the ideal, the formal

[conventionelle] world by which the miserable taste of the French has replaced the ideal.

Shakespeare never portrays either an ideal or a formal world but always the *real* world. The ideal appears in him in the construction of his plays. Moreover he is able to place himself with ease into every nationality and period as if it were his own, i.e. he draws them as *wholes* untroubled by less important details.

What men undertake, how and where they are able to do it, all this Shakespeare knew. He is therefore at home everywhere; nothing is strange or astonishing to him. He observes a much higher spectacle than that of customs and times. The style of his plays is determined by the subject and they differ one from another (in no way according to chronology) according to the harshness, softness, regularity or freedom of the verses, and the brevity and abruptness or the length of the sentences.

Now, to make mention of what remains to be said about the outward structure of modern tragedy, and in order not to waste time describing the necessary changes which must result from the differences already mentioned (such as the abandoning of the three unities, the division of the whole into scenes, etc.): so, again, the *combination* of prose and verse in modern drama is the outward expression of its inwardly mixed epic and dramatic nature. Leaving aside the so-called domestic or inferior tragedies [Trauerspielen] where the characters quite justifiably express themselves in prose, its use *from time to time* was necessary just because of the exposition of dramatic richness in secondary characters. Shakespeare has shown himself a master in this combination of prose and verse and in observing what is right as far as the language is concerned; not only in individual instances but in the work as a whole. Thus in *Hamlet* the structure of the sentences is confused, abrupt, troubled like the hero. In the historical plays based on early and more recent English and on Roman history, there prevails a very discrepant tone in terms of cultivation and purity. In the Roman plays there is almost no verse. On the other hand in the English plays, especially those based on early history, there is a great deal that is exceedingly picturesque [pittoresk].

The accusations of perversity and even coarseness that people make against Shakespeare are mostly not valid, and are only considered to be so by a narrow and feeble taste. Yet by no one does his true greatness go more unrecognized than by his fellow countrymen, the *English* critics and admirers. They cling to single presentations of passion or of a character; to the psychology, to scenes, to words, without any feeling for the whole, or for art. When one takes a look at the English critics, as Tieck says very tellingly, it is as if, travelling in a beautiful landscape, one were to pass by an inn in front of which drunken peasants were squabbling.[11]

That Shakespeare wrote by some happy inspiration and in completely unconscious mastery of his art is a very common error and a myth put

On Dante in Relation to Philosophy
[Über Dante in philosophischer Beziehung]

1803

Translated by Elizabeth Rubenstein and DS.

German text in *SW*, V, 152–63. First published in *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, II (1803), 35–50.

Introductory note

Schelling's essay on Dante in many ways continues the themes outlined in the remarks on Shakespeare. Dante's importance as the prototype of the modern artist depends upon his creation of an individual mythology; thus he sets an example for other possible representations of the fragmented world.

Much of what Schelling says here is taken over (and acknowledged) by A.W. Schlegel in his *Lectures on Fine Art and Literature* (see 1962–74, IV, 169–81), who also finds Dante prophetic of the whole of modern poetry. Schlegel had written on Dante earlier, and had himself translated the *Inferno* along with sections of the other two parts of the *Divine Comedy*. Schelling's essay is apparently in reaction to Friedrich Bouterwek's negative judgement in his *Geschichte der Poesie und Beredsamkeit* (1801): see Wellek (1955), II, 80.

Those who love the past more than the present will not find it strange to find themselves drawn away from its not always rewarding aspects and taken back to such a distant monument of philosophy combined with poetry as the works of Dante, which have long been overshadowed by the sacrosanctness of antiquity.

As justification for the space which these thoughts here occupy, I demand for the time being no other admission than that the poem to which they refer presents one of the most remarkable problems concerning the philosophical and historical construction of art. What follows will show that this inquiry contains within it a far more general one, which concerns the circumstances of philosophy itself, and is of no less interest for philosophy than for poetry. Their reciprocal merging, to which the whole modern age is inclined, demands equally determinate conditions on both sides.[1]

In the Holy of Holies,
where religion and poetry ally,

about by a completely misinformed age, one which began in England with Pope.[12] Of course the Germans often misunderstood him, not just because they perhaps knew him only from a crude translation, but because the belief in art had disappeared altogether.

The poems of Shakespeare's youth – the *Sonnets, Adonis,* and *Lucrece* – testify to an extremely love-worthy nature and to a very *heartfelt, subjective* feeling, not to any unconscious genius-inspired storm or stress [Genie-Sturm oder Drang].[13] After this Shakespeare lived wholly in the world, as far as his environment allowed, until he began to reveal his existence in a world without any bounds, and to set it down in a series of works of art which truly portray the total infinity of art and nature.

Shakespeare's genius [Genius] is so all-encompassing that his name, like Homer's, could be taken to be a collective name; and as has indeed already happened, his works could be ascribed to different authors. (Here the individual is collective in the same way that the work is with the ancients.)

We might still view Shakespeare's art with a kind of hopelessness if we were absolutely bound to regard him as the zenith of romantic art in the drama; for barbarism must first be allowed him in order that he be seen as great, indeed divine within it. In his unboundedness Shakespeare cannot be compared with any of the ancient tragedians, but we must however be allowed to hope for a Sophocles of the differentiated [differenzürten] world, and to hope for appeasement in an art which is as it were *sinful.* At least the possibility of the fulfilment of this expectation seems to have been hinted at by a hitherto less well known source.[14]

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In the Holy of Holies,
where religion and poetry ally,

stands Dante as the high priest and he who initiates the whole course of modern art. Representing not just one single poem but the whole genre of modern poetry, and even a genre in its own right, the *Divine Comedy* stands so completely apart that no theory abstrated from individual models is adequate to describe it. As a world of its own, it demands its own theory. The author gave it the epithet 'divine' because it deals with theology and divine things; he called it a 'comedy' according to the basic concepts of this and of the opposite genre: because of the terrifying beginning and happy outcome, and because the mixed nature of his poem, whose subject matter is part sublime and part humble, makes a mixed kind of recitation necessary.

But it is easy to see that it cannot be called 'dramatic' according to the generally accepted concepts, because it does not portray a limited action. In as much as Dante himself is viewed as the main protagonist, one who serves as the link between the immeasurable series of visions and portraits, and who behaves passively rather than actively, then the poem might seem to approach the novel. But this definition does so little justice to the poem that it could be called 'epic', after another more common view [Vorstellung], since there is no sequential continuity in the objects portrayed.[2] To view it as a didactic poem is equally impossible, since it is written with a much more imprecise form and intention than that of the didactic poem. It is therefore not a particular example of any of the above, nor is it merely a combination of various parts of each. It is a quite unique and as it were organic fusion of all the elements of these genres, which cannot be reproduced by any arbitrary skill [Kunst]. It is an absolutely individual thing, not comparable to anything outside itself.

Broadly speaking, the subject matter of the poem is the clear-cut, essential identity of the whole age in which the poet lived, the imbuing of its events with the ideas [Ideen] of religion, scientific knowledge [Wissenschaft] and poetry [Poesie], conceived of in the most superior mind of that century. But it is not our intention to look at the poem in its immediate relation to its own time, but rather to see it in its universal validity [Allgemeingültigkeit] and in its role of archetype for the whole of modern poetry.

The necessary law governing the as yet undetermined, far-away point where the great epic of modern times, which has revealed itself up to now only rhapsodically and in single manifestations, emerges as a complete totality, is this: that the individual moulds that part of the world revealed to him into a whole, and creates his own mythology [Mythologie] from the material of his age, from its history and its scientific learning. For just as the ancient world is in general a world of types, so the modern is one of individuals. There it is the general that is truly particular; the species acts as a single individual. Here on the other hand the point of departure is particularity, which is supposed to become general. For that reason every-

thing among the ancients is enduring and everlasting. Number seems to have no force, since the concept of the general fuses with that of the individual. Among the moderns change and alteration are a constant law. Not a completed, closed circle but one to be endlessly expanded through individuality determines its modifications, and because universality is of the essence of poetry, the necessary requirement is this: that through the most supreme uniqueness the individual should become universally valid again. Through fully developed particularity he must become once more absolute. It is through the sheer individuality of his poem, comparable to nothing else, that Dante is the creator of modern art, which cannot be conceived of without this arbitrary necessity and necessary arbitrariness.

From the very beginnings of Greek poetry, in Homer onwards, we see a poetry clearly distinct from scientific learning and philosophy, and this process of separation continued right up to the total polarization of poets and philosophers, who sought in vain to effect a harmony through allegorical explanations of the Homeric poems. In more recent times scientific knowledge has moved ahead of poetry and mythology, which indeed cannot be mythology without being universal and drawing into itself all elements of the existing culture – science, religion, art itself – and combining not just the material of the present but also that of the past to form a perfect unity. Since art demands the completed, the self-contained, and the limited, while the spirit of the modern world pushes towards the unlimited and tears down every barrier with unshakable determination, the individual must enter into this conflict, but with absolute freedom. He must seek to achieve lasting shapes out of the confusion of the age, and into the arbitrarily produced forms of the images of his poetry [Dichtung] he must again impart universal validity.

This Dante has done. He had the material of present as of past history in front of him. He could not work it into a pure epic, partly because of its nature, partly because by so doing he would have excluded other aspects of the culture of his time. Contemporary astronomy, theology and philosophy also belonged to this whole. He could not present them in a didactic poem because he would thereby limit himself once more, and in order to be universal his poem had to be at the same time historical. There was need of a completely freely willed [willkürlich] invention, emanating from the individual and able to combine this material and shape it organically into a whole. To present the ideas of philosophy and theology in symbols [Symbole] was impossible because there was no symbolic mythology in existence.[3] No more could he make his poem completely allegorical, because it would then no longer be historical. Therefore it had to be a completely unique mixture of the allegorical and the historical. In the exemplary poetry [Poesie] of the ancients no alternative of this kind was possible.[4] Only the individual was able to seize it, only free invention pure and simple could pursue it.

Dante's poem is not allegorical in the sense that the figures simply stand for something else, without being independent of this meaning and thus something in themselves. On the other hand none of them is independent of the meaning in such a way that it becomes one with the idea itself, and more than allegorical of it. There is thus in Dante's poem a quite unique middle point between allegory and symbolic-objective forms. For example, there is no doubt – and the poet has explained it himself elsewhere – that Beatrice is an allegory, namely of theology. So also her companions, and many other figures. However they still register in their own right and enter as historical characters, without for that purpose being symbols.

In this respect Dante is archetypal, since he has expressed what the modern poet must do in order to set forth in its entirety and in a poetic whole the history and culture of his time and the particular mythological material that is before him. He must combine the allegorical and the historical with absolute freedom of choice [Willkür]. He must be allegorical, and is so against his will, because he cannot be symbolic; and historical, because he must be poetic. The invention that he produces is in this respect unique every time, a world unto itself, wholly dependent on the personality.

In a similar way the one German poem of universal proportions joins together the most extreme aspects of the struggles of the age by the wholly individual invention of a partial mythology: the figure of Faust. However, this may be regarded as a comedy far more in the Aristophanic sense than is Dante's poem, and as divine in a different and more poetic sense.[5]

The energy with which the individual shapes the particular combination of the available materials of his life and times determines the extent to which it receives mythological force. Because of the place in which he sets them, which is eternal, Dante's characters already take on a kind of eternity. But not only the real events taken from his own times, like the story of Ugolino amongst others, but also what he has wholly invented, like the fate of Ulysses and his companions, take on in the context of his poem a truly mythological conviction.

To present Dante's philosophy, physics and astronomy purely in and for themselves would only be of minor interest, since his true uniqueness lies solely in the manner of their merging with poetry. The Ptolemaic cosmology, which is to some extent the basis of poetic edifice, already has a mythological colouring in itself; but if his philosophy is generally described as Aristotelian, then what must be understood here is not the purely peripatetic version but rather the particular connection current at that time between it and Platonic ideas, one which reveals itself on repeated investigations of the poem.[6]

We do not wish to dwell on the force and integrity of individual points, nor on the simplicity and infinite naivety of the individual images in which he expresses his philosophical ideas, such as the well-known one of the soul, which emerges from the hands of God as a little girl, childlike in its

laughter and crying, an innocent little soul that knows nothing beyond what is controlled by its joyous creator, turning gladly to what amuses it.[7] We are only concerned with the generally symbolic form of the whole, in whose absoluteness the universal validity and eternal nature of this poem is more than anywhere else apparent.

If the union of philosophy and poetry even at the most elementary level of synthesis is viewed as didactic poetry then it is necessary, because the poem should be without any ulterior motive, that the intention to instruct is again in itself overcome and turned into an absolute, so that it can seem to exist for its own sake. This is however only conceivable if knowledge [Wissen], as image of the universe and in complete harmony with it, is in and for itself poetic, as with the most original and beautiful poetry. Dante's poem is a much more elevated interpenetration of scientific learning and poetry, and all the more must its form, even in its freer self-sufficiency, be attuned to the general paradigm of the world view [Weltanschauung].

The division of the universe and the arrangement of the subject matter into three realms, the *Inferno, Purgatorio,* and *Paradiso* is, independent of the particular significance of these concepts in Christianity, also a general symbolic form, so that one does not see why each age depicted in the same way could not have its divine comedy. Just as for recent drama the five-act form is regarded as usual, because each event can be seen in its beginning, continuation, culmination, progress to completion and actual ending; so for the higher prophetic poetry which expresses a whole age that trichotomy of Dante's is conceivable as a general form, but one whose filling out would be endlessly varied as it is revitalized by the power of original invention. That form is eternal, not only as outward form but also as sensuous [sinnbildlich] expression of the inner paradigm of all scientific knowledge and poetry, and is capable of containing within it the three great domains of science and culture: nature, history, and art. Nature, as the birthplace of all things, is eternal night, and as that unity through which they have their being in themselves, it is the aphelion of the universe, the place of distance from God as the true centre.[8] Life and history, whose nature is a succession of step by step advances, is simply a refining process, a transition to an absolute state. This is present only in art, which anticipates eternity, and is the *Paradiso* of life, truly at the centre.

Looked at from all sides Dante's poem is not therefore a single work of a particular time and stage of culture, but is archetypal through its universal validity, which it unites with absolute individuality. Its universality excludes no aspects of life and culture, and its form finally is not a particular paradigm but above all the paradigm of the contemplation of the universe.

The particular internal structure of the poem can certainly not have universal validity, since it is formed according to the concepts of the time and the particular intentions of the poet. On the other hand, as can only be

expected of such an artistic and totally deliberate work, the universal inner paradigm is symbolized externally by the shape, colour and tone of the three great sections of the poem.

Given the uncommon nature of his subject matter Dante needed a kind of authentication for the detailed form of his inventions, which only the scientific learning of his age could give him. This is for him, as it were, the mythology and the general foundation which supports the bold edifice of these inventions. But even in details he remains quite true to his intention of being allegorical without ceasing to be historical and poetic. Hell, purgatory and paradise are so to speak simply the physical and structural expression of the system of theology. The measurements, numbers and proportions which he observes within it were prescribed by scientific learning, and here he deliberately gave up freedom of invention in order to give his poem, which was unlimited as far as the material was concerned, necessity and limitation through form. The universal sacredness and significance of the numbers is another exterior form on which his poetry is based. Thus for him all the logical and syllogistic erudition of his time is mere form, which must be conceded to him if we are to arrive at that region in which his poetry exists.

Nevertheless in this attachment to religious and scientific representations Dante never seeks any kind of common poetic probability as the most universally valid thing that his age had to offer. Indeed, he overcomes all inclination to pander to the coarser faculties [Sinnen]. His first entry into hell takes place, as it had to, without any unpoetic attempt to motivate it or make it comprehensible; it is a state similar to a vision, without there being any intention of making this state account for it. His elevation through the eyes of Beatrice, through which the divine force so to speak transmitted itself to him, is expressed in a single line.[9] The wondrous nature of his own encounters he turns directly into a figure of the secrets of religion, and gives credence to them through the still higher mystery, such as when he makes his absorption into the moon, which he compares to a ray of light being in water but not cleaving it, into an image of God's incarnation.[10]

To explain the fullness of art and the depth of intention in the internal construction of the three parts of the world in detail would be a special science in itself. This was recognized by his nation a short time after the death of the poet, for they set up a special Dante Chair, which Boccaccio was the first to take up.

What is universally meaningful in the first section shines through each of the three parts of the poem, and not only in their particular inventions; the law which applies to them expresses this meaningfulness still more precisely in the inner and spiritual rhythm through which they are set against one another. Just as the *Inferno* is the most objectively terrible in its subject matter, so it is the strongest in expression and the strictest in diction,

sombre and full of dread in its very choice of words. In one part of *Purgatorio* a deep stillness prevails, as the laments of the nether world grow silent, and on its hills, the forecourts of heaven, everything is glorious.[11] *Paradiso* is a true music of the spheres.

The diversity and variety of the punishments in the *Inferno* have been thought out with an almost unparalleled inventiveness. There is nothing other than a poetic connection between the crimes and the torments. Dante's spirit is not outraged by the horrific; indeed, he goes to the extreme limit of horror. But it can be shown in each individual case that he never ceases to be sublime and therefore truly beautiful. For what those who are not in a position to grasp the whole have singled out as base or inferior is not so in the sense that they mean but is a necessary element of the mixed nature of the poem, for which reason Dante himself calls it 'comedy'. The hatred of evil and the anger of a divine mind, as expressed in Dante's terrifying composition, are not the portion of ordinary souls. The generally held view is indeed very doubtful: that it was the exile from Florence, before which he had dedicated his poetry almost solely to love, that had first spurred on his mind (already inclined to the serious and the extraordinary) to the highest inventiveness, in which he breathed forth the whole of his life, the whole density of his heart and fatherland, together with his displeasure over them.[12] But the vengeance that he takes in the *Inferno* is taken in the name of the Last Judgement. He speaks with prophetic force as an authorized criminal judge; not from personal hatred, but as a pious soul outraged by the atrocities of the times, and with a love of the fatherland long since unknown. Thus he represents himself at one point in the *Paradiso:*

> If e'er the sacred poem, that hath made
> Both Heaven and earth copartners in its toil.
> And with lean abstinence, through many a year,
> Faded my brow, be destined to prevail
> Over the cruelty, which bars me forth
> Of the fair sheep-fold, where, a sleeping lamb
> The wolves set on and fain had worried me;
> With other voice, and fleece of other grain,
> I shall forthwith return; and, standing up
> At my baptismal font, shall claim the wreath
> Due to the poet's temples.[13]

He moderates the horrors of the torments of the damned by his own feeling, which at the final goal of so much misery almost so overcomes his vision that he desires to weep, and Virgil says to him: "Why are you afflicted?"[14]

It has already been remarked that most of the punishments in *Inferno* symbolize the crimes which are punished by them, but several are symbolic in a much more general context. One particular example of this type is the

portrayal of a metamorphosis where two natures change into and through one another and, so to speak, exchange material identity.[15] None of the metamorphoses of antiquity can measure up to this in terms of invention, and if a naturalist or didactic poet were able to draw up with such force sensuous images of the eternal metamorphosis of nature, he might indeed call himself fortunate.

As already observed, the *Inferno* differs from the other parts not only in terms of the outward form of the presentation, but also because it is chiefly concerned with the realm of figures [Gestalten] and is thus the tangibly embodied [plastische] part of the poem. *Purgatorio* must be recognized as the picturesque. Not only are the penances which are here imposed on the sinners in part quite pictorially treated, even going so far as mirth; but the pilgrimage over the sacred mount of the place of penance in particular presents a rapid succession of fleeting views, scenes, and manifold effects of light.[16] At its final limits, after the poet has arrived at Lethe, the greatest splendour of painting and colour opens up in the descriptions of the ancient divine groves of that region, of the heavenly clarity of the waters that are clouded by their eternal shadows, of the virgin whom he encounters on the shore, and of the arrival of Beatrice in a cloud of flowers, under a white veil crowned with olives, wrapped in a green mantle, and clad in purple living flame.[17]

The poet has forced his way to the light through the centre of the earth. In the darkness of the underworld only shapes [Gestalt] could be distinguished. In *Purgatorio* the light is kindled by earthly matter, and becomes colour. In *Paradiso* only the pure music of light remains, the reflection ceases, and the poet raises himself gradually to the contemplation [Anschauung] of the transparent, pure substance of the Godhead itself.

The view of the cosmos at the time of the poet, and of the properties of the stars and the extent of their movement, is, invested with mythological dignity, the foundation upon which his inventions in this part of the poem rest. And if in this sphere of absoluteness he nevertheless allows gradations and differences to appear, then he overcomes [aufhebt] them with the splendid pronouncement which he has spoken forth by one of the sister souls he encounters on the moon: that every place in heaven is paradise.[18]

The structure of the poem requires that the highest principles of theology be discussed, precisely because of the elevation through paradise. The high respect for this science is exemplified by the love for Beatrice. It is necessary that in the same measure as contemplation [Anschauung] melts into the purely universal so poetry loses its forms and becomes music. In this respect the *Inferno* might appear as the most poetic part. But certainly nothing can be taken separately here, and the particular excellence of every part of the poem can only be understood and truly recognized in its harmony with the whole. If the relationship of the three parts is taken as a whole, then it has to be seen that the *Paradiso* is the purely

musical and lyrical part by the very intention of the poet, who demonstrates this in external forms through the frequent use of the Latin words of church hymns.

The extraordinary greatness of this poem, which shines forth in the interpenetration of all elements of poetry and art, in this way fully reaches outward manifestation. This divine work is neither plastic, nor picturesque, nor musical, but all of these at the same time and in a mutual harmony. It is not dramatic, not epic, not lyric, but a completely individual and unparalleled combination of all of these.

At the same time I believe that I have shown that it is prophetic and exemplary [vorbildlich] for the whole of modern poetry. It contains all the attributes of modern poetry within it, and emerges from the frequently blended subject matter of the same as the first vintage to spread over earth to heaven, the first fruit of transfiguration. Those who want to get to know the poetry of more recent times at its source, rather than according to superficial concepts, may test themselves against this great and severe spirit [Geist], in order to know the means by which the totality of the modern age can be grasped, and that no easily created bond unites it. Those who are not called to do this may apply to themselves the words at the beginning of the first part:

All hope abandon, ye who enter here.[19]

contrary, Kant had not favoured this term, limiting all intuitions to sensible ones, whether pure (mere space and time) or empirical: see Kant (1933), B 147f. This did not of course interfere with the necessary appending of the 'I think' to all representations, and the deduction of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness (B 131ff.; see also A 287ff.). It is the discussion of the noumenon, or thing as thought in itself (see A 287f., and *CJ*, §77), which as it were opens the field for Fichte, whose use of the term in the *Wissenschaftslehre* never entirely loses the Kantian restraint: intellectual intuition is "the immediate consciousness that I act, and what I enact: it is that whereby I know something because I do it". It can never be apprehended in isolation, but is "an inference from the obvious facts of consciousness" (*SK*, pp. 38–9). Schelling took the case much further, and regarded Fichte as having stopped short, owing to the limits of his method, sooner than he need have. For Schelling, at this stage of his career, intellectual intuition is still partial, still too dialectically unresolved, and not yet totally objective, shifting between freedom and necessity. It is "the organ of all transcendental thinking" (1978, p. 27), without which all philosophy would be unintelligible, but requires the aesthetic intuition for its final expression: see the "General Observation" below. Harris and Cerf give useful accounts of the whole controversy over the "intellectual intuition", and its place in the development of Idealism, in Hegel (1977), pp. xxv–xxxv, 11–12, 69 n. 32. Hegel later attacked this entire terminology in his predecessors, though the grounds for this attack have themselves been queried (see Esposito (1977), pp. 175–8).

2 "Potency" is a (necessarily) ungainly translation of Schelling's *Potenz*, one of the key terms in his vocabulary. He worked with a model of three *Potenzen*, each embodying an ideal stage in the development of the absolute, which is the totality of all three. The clearest account of the *Potenzen* is in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Art* (*SW*, V, 366f.), the leading points of which are translated in Hegel (1977), pp. 53–4. There is also a useful schema in Engell (1981), pp. 307–8, where the three stages are related to the empirical, the productive (leading the intellectual) and the aesthetic intuitions.

3 Schelling would seem to be the source for Coleridge's fascination with this word and its cognates, taking it as he does much further than Kant had in his predominantly normative epistemology. See *SW*, V, 386:

> Through art the divine creation comes to be presented objectively, for it devolves through the same synthesis [Einbildung] of the infinite ideality into reality as does art. The excellent German word "Einbildungskraft" actually signifies the force of *making into one* [*Ineinsbildung*], upon which in fact all creation depends. It is the force whereby an ideal is similarly a reality, and the soul is a body; the force of individuation, which is the truly creative principle.

There is an important note some pages later (V, 395);

> In relation to *Phantasie* I define *Einbildungskraft* as that wherein the products of art are conceived and brought forth; *Phantasie* is that which intuits them outwardly, works them out of itself, so to speak, and thus presents them. In reason, and from its material, as it were, ideas [Ideen] are formed; the intellectual intuition is the inner presentational faculty. *Phantasie* is then the intellectual intuition in art.

4 One may suspect here another comment on the popularity of the aphoristic mode among the Romantic ironists.

5 The arguments and imagery of the two preceding paragraphs are very close to those of Shelley in *A Defence of Poetry*. For a different emphasis of the relation between philosophy and art, see (1966), p. 147: "because both are absolute, each can be the archetype of the other". The *Philosophy of Art*, written two years later than the *System*, is also less rhapsodic about the primacy of art over philosophy: see *SW*, V, 364f.

Given that art is here the most complete "objectivation" of philosophy, which is itself "a progressive history of self-consciousness" (1978, p. 2), we can see the potential in Schelling's system for a historical analysis of art as an index of the genetic development of the absolute – the kind of analysis made famous by Hegel. In the *Philosophy of Art* Schelling defines *Mythologie* as the "necessary condition and primary material of all art" (*SW*, V, 405), and it is the Greeks who provide the exemplary case. In his later writing on "mythology" Schelling employs the term to define religious doctrines prior to revelation – necessary to such revelation but superseded by it. Here, as in the essay on Dante and the comments on Shakespeare (see below), the word seems to suggest a unifying body of representations held in common by an artist, his public, and the idea which he objectifies; i.e., a body of material from which art may emerge and in whose terms it may be understood.

6 Compare *CJ*, §65, on "organization".

7 Schelling's exposition seems confused here because the other models of the *Potenzen* (see note 2 above) include only three stages. It might be pointed out that in this case simple sensation is the second stage, preceded (for the philosophical consciousness only) by an act of uncontingent self-intuition; and that the third stage includes the other two and yet another, which leads into the fourth stage, the union of the purposive and the unconscious. Schelling goes on to describe the importance of the recognition of other persons in a way clearly important for Hegel, and for the general passage of Idealist epistemology out of its Kantian focus on a single exemplary subjectivity operating with objects in the world.

8 The categorical imperative is the famous centrepiece to Kant's second *Critique* (1956), p. 30: "So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law." Schelling (1978), p. 188, puts it slightly differently: "thou shalt will only what all intelligences are able to will".

Philosophy of Art

1 I.e. an opposition or indifference not reconciled, not sublimated into a higher unity.

2 Schelling is here noticeably at odds with the notion of Shakespeare as a wild and untutored genius transforming everything he touches into things rich and strange; this may be a reaction to *Sturm und Drang* priorities.

3 In his explanation of the famous ἁμαρτία or "mistake" in Aristotle's *Poetics* (1453a) Schelling shows himself to be at one with more recent scholarship, which emphasizes the irrelevance of meditated and conscious decisions emanating from free will. Philoctetes, for example, wanders unknowingly into a forbidden place, making no decision of his own to do so.

4 Compare the extended comparison of the Greek and Christian worlds pursued earlier in the lectures, *SW*, V, 430–57. Among Christian cultures, "only Catholicism lives in a mythological world" (p. 443), but it can never achieve totality therein: "Catholicism is a necessary element of all modern poetry and mythol-

ogy, but it is not the whole of it, and in the purpose of the world spirit [Weltgeist] it can doubtless only be a part thereof" (p. 442).

5 *Poetics,* 1452b–1453a.

6 *King Lear,* IV, ii, 40–, or so I assume. Schelling's prose rendering of this passage is a long way from Shakespeare's verse, and seems to conflate various images from Albany's speech, the end of which I quote: "Wenn die Tiger des Waldes oder die Ungeheuer der See aus der Dumpfheit herausträten, so würden sie auf solche Weise wirken." There were several extant translations or adaptations of the play from which Schelling might have drawn: see Price and Price (1934), pp. 209–10.

7 *Henry VI, Part II,* IV, iv.

8 *Richard III,* V, iv, 7.

9 The identification of the modern with the fragmentary was a commonplace in Romantic thought and is explored elsewhere in Schelling, for example in the essay on Dante (below). Elsewhere in the lectures he comments that "the modern world generally can be called a world of individuals: the ancient world a world of species" (*SW,* V, 444); "*Originality* is the fundamental law of modern poetry . . . each truly creative individual has to create his own mythology" (p. 446). Protestantism is the symptom and analogue of this fact, and it is from Protestantism that Shakespeare's art emanates. Christianity as a whole had already broken apart the unity of the finite and the infinite by its preoccupation with the ideal at the expense of the mundane; Protestantism, being "essentially anti-universal", carries this trend even further. See Schelling (1966), pp. 89, 98. Compare p. 66:

> The modern world is in general a world of antitheses, whereas in antiquity, except for individual stirrings, the finite and the infinite were united under a common veil. The spirit of the modern era tore this veil and showed the one in absolute opposition to the other.

It is central to Schelling's reasoning here that the Greek gods easily and frequently took on human form.

10 Pythagoras was said to have deduced all the ratios of the octave as recognized by the Greeks in relation to a series of numbers from 1 to 4.

11 In the *Letters on Shakespeare* (1800), Tieck speaks of "a whole gallery of English commentators, whom perhaps one ought rather to pass over, since when I read Shakespeare and from time to time chance to cast an eye over the notes, then I am in exactly the same spirits as if, journeying through a beautiful romantic landscape, one were to go by a tavern in which drunken peasants were bickering and fighting". See Tieck (1848–52), I, 147. Tieck's residence in England seems to have left him with an abiding disrespect for the English common man.

12 Perhaps a reference to Pope's remark about a "fluent Shakespear" who "scarce effac'd a line" ('Imitations of Horace', Ep. II, i, 279), or to his contrast of "Shakespear's nature" with "Johnson's art" (*The Dunciad,* Bk II, A 216, B 224). For Pope, the whole case for the spontaneity of Shakespeare as against any element of premeditation was evidence to be adduced in the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, and in the support of his particular polemic against Theobald and other 'learned' editors.

13 Schelling means to rescue not only the mature Shakespeare, for whose mediated and derivative genius he has already argued, but also the youthful poet from the *Sturm und Drang* image of him as the vehicle of an unconscious emotional outpouring.

14 By "sinful" Schelling presumably means an art not based on recognition of or reconciliation with the gods; "unboundedness" is in this sense not a positive quality, and it is Sophocles who is for him the pinnacle of the dramatic art. The "less well-known source" is Spain, and it is Calderón (whom Schelling knew in A.W. Schlegel's translation) especially who is, so to speak, the "Catholic Shakespeare" (V, 726), and who has less need of the "characteristic" because he can deploy a "true fate" (p. 729): "this highest and absolute composure [Besonnenheit], this ultimate indifference of intention and necessity, is achieved in such a way by Calderón alone among the moderns" (p. 729).

On Dante in Relation to Philosophy

1 This recapitulates the end of the argument of the *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), where art is presented as the consummation of philosophy, each being the complement of the other. The lectures on the *Philosophy of Art* (1802–3), had made poetry the highest among the arts:

> Poetry . . . permits the absolute act of cognition [Erkenntnißakt] to appear immediately as an act of cognition, and is thus the highest potency [Potenz] of the plastic arts, as it maintains in synthesis both nature and the character of the ideal, of essence, of the universal. That through which plastic art expresses its ideas is something in itself concrete; the speaking art does it through something in itself *universal,* namely language. *SW,* V, 631

2 Schelling elsewhere defines the epic as the unity of freedom and necessity without any opposition between finite and infinite. Its action is "timeless" because it does not involve the difference between possibility and actuality which is the basis of time. See *SW,* V, 646, 648.

3 Compare *SW,* V, 554–5:

> An image is *symbolic* when its object not only signifies the idea, but *itself* is the idea, . . . the most completely symbolic representation is afforded by the static and independent poetic form of a particular *mythology.* So St Mary Magdalene not only *signifies* repentance, but she is herself living repentance.

4 Nor, indeed, was it necessary, Schelling means to imply.

5 See also the discussion of *Faust* in *SW,* V, 731–4.

6 For an account of the limited number of Aristotle's texts available to mediaeval scholars, and the consequent Platonized versions of this thought in circulation, see Edwards (1967), article "Aristotelianism".

7 The history of the birth of the soul is recounted by Statius in *Purgatorio,* XXV, 52ff.

8 The aphelion is that part of a planet's orbit when it is furthest from the sun.

9 In the first printing of these notes (DS, 1984) I was unsure whether any single line would fit the literal terms of Schelling's paraphrase. Ronald Martinez suggested *Purgatorio,* VI, 45, reasoning persuasively that the reference would be to the second book of the *Comedy,* since in this and the preceding paragraph Schelling refers to all three books in sequence (see DS, p. 272). Rachel Jacoff has since pointed out to me that most of the references to Beatrice's eyes occur

in *Purgatorio* XXX and XXXI. And indeed there is one line, XXXI, 119, which does seem to correspond to the terms of Schelling's description.

10 *Paradiso,* II, 34f.

11 Presumably in the first canto of the *Purgatorio,* describing the ascent out of hell. Schlegel translated ll. 1–28.

12 Schelling himself repeats this view in *SW,* V, 644.

13 *Paradiso,* XXV, 1–9. I cite from Henry Cary's translation (1805–6, reprinted 1814), which became the one most familiar to nineteenth-century English readers.

14 *Inferno,* XXIX, 1–8.

15 Schelling may have in mind the famous meeting with Paolo and Francesca in *Inferno,* V, or perhaps the wood of the suicides, where men have become trees (*Inferno,* XIII).

16 *Purgatorio,* III–XXVII.

17 *Purgatorio,* XXV.

18 *Paradiso,* III, 88–90.

19 *Inferno,* III, 9.

A.W. SCHLEGEL

Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature

[These notes are from KMW.]

1 Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68), archaelogist and aesthetician, whose *History of Ancient Art* (1762) powerfully influenced German criticism.

2 Here Schlegel follows closely Herder in his 'Shakespeare' essay in *Von Deutscher Art und Kunst.*

3 François Hemsterhuis (1721–90), Dutch aesthetician and moral philosopher.

4 Pietro Antonio Domenico Buonaventura Metastasio (Pietro Trapassi, 1698–1782), Italian poet. Vittorio Alfieri (1749–1803), Italian dramatist.

5 Schlegel's point is at variance with the views of Friedrich Schlegel and Solger. See Walzel (1938) for discussion of this and other of Schlegel's most important deviations from romantic irony theory.

6 As for example in *Hamlet,* Act III, scene ii, in Hamlet's instructions to the actors.

7 Samuel Johnson, *Preface to Shakespeare,* ed. W.K. Wimsatt (Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 62ff.

8 Here again Schlegel would seem to be in disagreement with his brother, and with Novalis, Solger, and Jean Paul, all of whom had a more synthetic notion of the relation of humour and seriousness. For a discussion of this, see KMW, p. 20ff.

9 See Goethe's 'Zum Shakespeares Tag' (1771) and the *Hamlet* discussion from *Wilhelm Meister* included in this anthology; Goethe's own views underwent considerable change between the writing of these two pieces.

10 The player's speech about Hecuba occurs in *Hamlet,* Act III, scene ii, ll. 270–5.

11 Friedrich Ludwig Schröder (1744–1816), German actor, in charge of the Hamburg Theatre for many years at the end of the century, published alterations and translations of plays.

12 For Shakespeare's handling of the Maid of Orleans legend, see *The First Part of King Henry VI.*

GOETHE

Winckelmann

[These notes are from HBN.]

1 J.J. Winckelmann (1717–68), author of *Thoughts on the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks* (1755), which marked the beginning of the passion for the Hellenic ideal in German culture. The text is translated in HBN (1985), pp. 32–54.

2 Compare Schiller's parallel distinction between ancients and moderns in his essay *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry.*

3 Winckelmann's role here as an antique spirit in the modern age recalls, and is doubtless to some extent modelled on, that of Goethe himself as portrayed in Schiller's essay.

4 The dire consequences of over-specialisation and the division of labour are a frequent theme in the late eighteenth century in Germany. This problem is discussed at length, with suggested remedies, by Schiller in his *On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters* (1795): see the bilingual edition of this work, with an excellent introduction and commentary, by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford, 1967), and the selections in the present volume.

5 The following glorification of pagan attitudes is doubtless intended by Goethe in part as a counterblast to the Catholicising tendencies of the German Romantics, which he deplores on various occasions around this time.

6 Mythological figures: Chloris, the only surviving daughter of Niobe, and Thyia, who became by Apollo the mother of Delphus.

7 Friedrich Wilhelm Lamprecht, a pupil of Winckelmann in his school-teaching days, with whom he subsequently lived for a time.

8 *Der sich immer steigernden Natur.* Goethe's concept of *Steigerung* (enhancement, intensification) is evident in many of his poetic works – particularly those which culminate on an ideal or transcendental plane – from *Egmont* to *Faust,* Part II. In the present essay it is combined with the triadic model favoured by Schiller, as in the section on *Antiquity* (above).

9 *Steigert:* see previous note.

10 Lost work by Phidias in gold and ivory, among the most celebrated sculptures of antiquity.

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Richter's own notes

a Only the majority and minority, the minimum and maximum permit this expression. For no man actually differs qualitatively from another. Like the rise and fall of peoples, the transition from servile childhood to morally free adulthood,